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Introduction: The new orthodoxy and its problems 
I cannot imagine a better introduction to the mainstream philosophical debate about 
artificial intelligence than that provided by Hubert Dreyfus in this volume.1  Dreyfus, 
as he explains, is now to be included within the mainstream, a position he has 
achieved after a notoriously unjustified delay of many decades, and by a process 
which is, to some extent, described in the paper itself (AI students attending his MIT 
seminar and so forth).  Dreyfus by pulling things together so clearly, has actually 
made it easier to see what is still wrong even now that he and Heidegger have been 
grasped to the bosom of AI.  What is missing is not, however, what Dreyfus says it is 
– more of his type of Heidegger.  What is missing is any understanding of the 
distinction between humans and animals.2   
                                                 
 
 
1 Dreyfus, Hubert, 2008, `Why Heidegerrian AI failed and why fixing it would make 
it more Heideggerian.’  Pps 000-000 in After Cognitivism, ed Karl Leidlmaier, 
Dordrecht: Kluwer 
2 Evan Selinger has pointed out to me that in so far as Dreyfus concentrates on the 
embodiment aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy he is not being faithful to Heidegger 
himself.  Heidegger’s overall approach includes a marked discontinuity between 
humans and animals.  Heidegger, then, is not being clasped quite so close to the 
bosom of AI as Bert’s paper implies.  Selinger suggests that, ironically, in this respect 
the critique advanced here is more Heideggerian than Dreyfus’s paper.  My 
knowledge of Heidegger is minimal, so where I refer to Heidegger in this paper I 
should really be talking about `Dreyfus’s Heidegger’ at least as he appears here and in 
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Well, actually, this problem is partly alluded to on the very last page, where Dreyfus 
says, `If we can’t make our brain model responsive to the significance in the 
environment as it shows up specifically for human beings, the project of developing 
an embedded and embodied Heideggerian AI can’t get off the ground’ (Dreyfus’s 
stress).  But, on the evidence presented here and elsewhere, what Dreyfus means by 
`specifically for human beings’ is not so different from what he might mean by 
`specifically for rabbits,’ or `specifically for kangaroos’ – that is just another species 
of animal.   
To lean over backwards to be fair, Dreyfus does mention en passant on that last page 
that humans have `personal and cultural self-interpretation.’  He does not, however, 
discuss its significance, nor how it makes us radically discontinuous from animals in 
respect of the project of AI.  I will argue that the difference is huge.  Thus, if we are 
concerned with animals alone it is possible to foresee the building of machines that 
mimic the behaviour of living entities from rabbits and kangaroos to cats and dogs so 
long as we get better and better at what we do now, but it is not possible to foresee the 
building of machines that could mimic most of the things done by humans.  In sum, 
we can visualise how we might build artificial rabbits and the like but not how we 
might build artificial members of a natural language-speaking community. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
other works by Dreyfus on AI – that is where I get my Heidegger from.  Karl 
Leidlmaier has made similar points about the relationship between Heidegger and 
Dreyfus’s AI-Heidegger as his introduction to this volume indicates.   
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Dreyfus, above all, understands `the frame problem.’  The frame problem is how a 
creature decides what is going on in a constantly changing world so it can adjust its 
reactions to it in an appropriate way.  The frame problem is described by Dreyfus on 
page XX: if you try to restrict your computer’s choice of actions to a set of `recipes’ 
appropriate to the frame -- at a dinner party bring a bottle of wine -- at a restaurant 
buy a bottle of wine – at the very best you have the problem of deciding which frame 
you are in at the time and this needs another recipe and so on ad infinitum.  It amounts 
to what, following Wittgenstein, we can call the `rules regress’ – each rule for action 
requires another rule to explain how it is to be applied, and each of those rules 
requires another rule, and so on.  But as you read Dreyfus’s paper it is apparent that 
the examples of this problem, and the related problems, as they face humans, are all 
mingled together with the examples of the problems as they face rabbits and other 
creatures.   
The reason humans and animals are mixed up is, I believe, easy to fathom: Dreyfus, 
and those he invokes, are obsessed with individuals and particularly individuals’ 
bodies.  They say, correctly, that the solution to the frame problem is to be found not 
by making models of ever more complicated representations of the world but by 
understanding how we actually live and interact with the world itself – using the 
world is its own representation.  But the key examples the provide are always bodily 
interaction with a physical environment such as Heidegger’s ready-to-hand hammer.  
No wonder the rabbit and carrot fit in so smoothly.  Even when Dreyfus does mention 
culture he talks of `personal and cultural self-interpretation,’ a grudging and awkward 
formulation which still hankers for the individual.   
What I will now do is use a few examples in an attempt to show why this whole new 
orthodoxy is misplaced because it does not recognise that humans and animals are not 
continuous in terms of the problems of AI.  I will try to show that any treatment that 
does not separate humans and non-humans at the outset, however Merleau-Pontyish, 
or Heidegger/Dreyfusian it is, like Wittgenstein’s fly, bound to keep smashing its 
head into the glass of the social.   
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Most of the arguments I want to make are already in print, sometimes in the form of 
debates with others, including Bert, so here I’ll just outline them and provide 
references to the more complete treatments.  It seems worth going over again since 
the arguments below are certainly not part of any AI orthodoxy.  In that follows, I first 
provide a reminder about what is special about humans, then show what is significant 
in respect of AI about humans’ embeddedness in societies, and then pull together the 
arguments about the special nature of language in a new way.   
Socialness 
The overall argument is that humans and animals are different because the former 
have language and culture whereas the latter do not.  Human individuals experience 
the physical world quite differently depending on the social groups in which they 
have been brought up.  These different collective experiences are `embodied’ in 
natural languages.  Even domestic animals such as dogs and cats, whose upbringing 
has a huge overlap with the upbringing of human children, and whose social 
experience is as varied as that of their human masters and mistresses, just aren't 
expected to have the equivalent degree of differentiation in the way they know the 
world and act within it.  For example, there are no vegetarian cats or dogs.  It is 
whatever it is that allows there to be this kind of variation between groups of human 
beings, that is not found between groups of cats, dogs and other animals, that makes a 
crucial difference to AI.  Whatever it is, it not only creates differences, it also 
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provides the conditions for certain kinds of competence within groups of human 
beings that aren’t found in animals.  I am going to call that `whatever it is’ socialness.  
As a part of speech, think of socialness as like `consciousness.’  Think of it also as 
having the same role in the understanding of human action as David Chalmers claims 
in respect of consciousness – a fundamental constituent of the world or the same order 
of the four forces that enter into physicists `dreams of a final theory.’ 3  I don’t know 
if Chalmers is right about consciousness but I think what he claims for it is certainly 
true of socialness.   
Incidentally, I don’t know if dolphins and chimps have language (and socialness) – if 
they do to some extent, then to that extent they can go on the human side.  The 
argument is about entities that have language and socialness, whichever they are.  The 
domain of such entities is either coextensive, or nearly coextensive, with that of 
humans and I will use `humans’ as a short-hand term for such entities and not worry 
about boundary problems.   
At the same time, under my usage, bees do not have a language – what bees do, and 
what most animals do, is exchange signals.  The exchange of signals and the use of 
language are distinguishable by the fact that the former can be endlessly transformed 
from one coded form to another and back again without loss whereas whenever 
                                                 
 
 
3 Chalmers, 1996.  The argument about socialness is first made in Collins, 1998. 
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languages are translated they are likely to lose something because meaning is related 
to the culture in which they are embedded.4  Exchanges of signals can be understood 
(translated as it is sometimes said but the correct word is `decoded’) by anyone and 
that is why we can `understand’ the `language’ of bees (that is, we can `decipher the 
code’).  Languages proper can be translated only by those who have a cultural overlap 
with the entity doing the speaking and that is why it so hard to know whether dolphins 
are speaking a language and that is why to support the claim that apes can use 
language we have to teach them ours.   
Embeddednes in society 
The difference that being in society makes has been analysed at length by Martin 
Kusch and myself in our 1998 book called The Shape of Actions.  We divide the 
domain of human actions into two types.  `Mimeomorphic actions’ can be copied 
merely by replicating the externally visible behaviours regularly associated with the 
action – for example, punching in a predetermined number on a telephone keyboard.  
Polimorphic actions do not have behaviours regularly associated with them, however, 
so they cannot be copied just by copying visible behaviours.  For example, the action 
of greeting, if it is to remain `greeting,’ rather than saluting, or insulting, or jesting, 
has to have variation in its behavioural instantiations.  To repeat a greeting in just the 
                                                 
 
 
4 These definitions are from work in progress. 
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same way every time would not work as greeting.  Furthermore, different polimorphic 
actions are sometimes instantiated with identical behaviours.  An example is signing 
your name, which might be paying money – as in signing a cheque – putting the 
finishing flourish to a written declaration of love, or surrendering the future of your 
country to the domination of a foreign power.   
In the case of mimeomorphic actions, understanding the relationship of behaviour to 
action is possible without understanding the society.  One could, with enough 
patience, simply work out the correlation between certain behaviours that you did not 
understand and certain consequences that you may or may not understand -- as those 
who study bees have come to decipher the dance.  One might even repeat those 
behaviours in order to bring about those consequences – as bird-watchers have 
learned to use bird-calls.  In contrast, in the case of polimorphic actions it is necessary 
to understand the society in order to interact.  Only if the social context in which the 
action is being carried out is understood can the appropriate behaviour for executing 
an action in a particular circumstance be generated.  Thus, when I greet my beloved 
after a long absence with the utterance `you bastard,’ there is a good chance that she 
will understand it as a declaration of love indicated by my anger at the misery she has 
inflicted on me by being apart from me for so long.  If I utter the same words on first 
meeting almost anyone else, things are likely to go wrong.   
This social embeddedness of the majority of our actions makes a difference to 
artificial intelligence.  The book by Kusch and I works this out in considerable detail 
but the point can be made with a single classical example which is mentioned in 
passing in Bert’s paper.  This is the example of bicycling, first famously invoked by 
Michael Polanyi to illustrate his concept of tacit knowledge – things we know but 
which we can’t tell.  I quite Bert’s whole paragraph because the context of Heidegger 
and the hammer is also exactly to the point. 
As usual with Heidegger, we must ask: what is the phenomenon he is pointing 
out? In this case he sees that, to observe our hammer or to observe ourselves 
hammering undermines our skillful coping. We can and do observe our 
surroundings while we cope, and sometimes, if we are learning, monitoring 
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our performance as we learn improves our performance in the long run, but in 
the short run such attention interferes with our performance. For example, 
while biking we can observe passers by, or think about philosophy, but if we 
start observing how we skillfully stay balanced, we risk falling over. 
I have no doubt that Bert and Heidegger are both right about the fact that we risk 
degrading our performance if we pay self-conscious attention to the way we execute 
certain physical actions such as hammering and balancing on a bicycle.  But this fact 
has to do only with the way humans perform such tasks efficiently.  The proof that 
this lack of human self-consciousness when carrying out physical tasks has nothing to 
do with our ability to make a machine that can do the act is obvious.  It is easy make 
an artificial bike riding machine and it has been done.  As far as I know it uses 
gyroscopes and a feedback system.  So if one wants to make an artificial bike-rider, 
the fact that humans do it best when they are not paying attention is neither here nor 
there.  And that is because balancing on a bike is a mimeomorphic action – anything 
that reproduces the behaviours mimics the action.5  As a matter of fact it is not even 
the case that humans can ride bikes only if they do not pay attention.  If we had much 
faster brains, or the equivalent – if we were riding on the surface of an asteroid with 
very low gravity so that the bike fell extremely slowly -- we could ride pretty well by 
                                                 
 
 
5 It is `mimics’ the action rather than `reproduces’ it because an action always goes 
with an intention and in the mechanical rider there is no intention. 
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self-consciously following a set of rules or diagrams in rather the same way as we 
assemble flat pack furniture.  The fact that in our world we have to do it 
unselfconsciously has to do with the limits to the way our bodies and brains work – 
our somatic limits.6   
But that is not all there is to bike riding.  There is a polimorphic component to bike-
riding that has to do with riding in traffic: when riding in traffic the conventions of the 
particular society in which one’s journey takes place has to be understood.  For 
example, bike-riding in China is very different to bike-riding in America and requires 
a different set of behaviours that can be grasped, so far as we know, only through 
socialization.  This grasping of the meaning of bike-riding in different societies, and 
consequent execution of the appropriate actions, is impossible to mimic by any 
currently foreseeable machine. 
The fact that Bert’s paper does not separate these two elements of bike-riding, or 
hammering for that matter, but runs them all together with rabbits’ carrot-eating, 
reveals the problem with the new orthodoxy.  It renders the glass, which is the social, 
invisible, and that is why it is destined, sooner, or, as it more and more appears, later, 
to bash its head against it.   
                                                 
 
 
6 This argument, and the use of the term `somatic limit tacit knowledge’ can be found 
in Collins 2007. 
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Language and embodiment 
The new way of pulling the arguments about language together turns on the role of 
the body.  I want to suggest that when one tries to understand animals the body has 
one role but when one understands humans it has another.  The difference lies in what 
I have called the social embodiment thesis and the minimal embodiment thesis.7  The 
first thesis is about is about the relationship of the bodily form of the species to the 
world while the second thesis is about the relationship of an individual’s body to the 
world.  Indisputably, the body form of the species affects the way of being in the 
world of that species and the individual members of it, and here there is no 
disagreement between my position and that of anyone else; this, to repeat, is the social 
embodiment thesis.  The minimal embodiment thesis is where we start to disagree:  
I claim that human individuals can have a way of being in the world that is, in most 
respects, identical to that other human beings even if their individual bodily form 
varies greatly from that of the species (for example they have severe congenital 
abnormalities); this is the minimal embodiment thesis.  I have argued that the reason 
this can be so is that in the case of humans the main determinant of much of the way 
of being in the world for the individual is not the body but language.  One can 
                                                 
 
 
7 See Collins and Evans 2007 for the latest use of these terms though they go back 
some years. 
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immediately see why I think the obsession with the body among the new expanded 
orthodoxy is misplaced. 
The logic of the idea can, perhaps, be illustrated by starting with animals.  Rabbits (an 
arbitrary choice) have evolved a behavioural repertoire that is intertwined with the 
evolution of their bodily form as a species.  For example, they are prey animals so 
they live in burrows where their predators cannot go.  They also have powerful legs 
and terrific acceleration so they can forage outside the burrow and get back to safety 
in a short time should a predator appear.  If a rabbit loses a leg its acceleration will not 
be so great and it will be easier prey.  If it loses two legs it will probably die pretty 
soon.  So rabbits’ way of being is very directly affected by individual bodily form.  
But to see the logic of how the individual body might not make a difference consider 
reproduction.   A male rabbit with only two legs can, during the short period it 
survives, sire a perfectly formed baby rabbit.  So, in respect of breeding, individual 
bodily form has no effect on `rabbitness.’  The rabbit case has the following logic: in 
respect of breeding, an individual rabbit remains completely unchanged so long as it 
is minimally embodied – ie, has nothing left of a body except those bits necessary to 
mate.  In all other respects, a severely deformed rabbit is not much like a rabbit. 
In humans there is a second respect in which an individual human can survive pretty-
well unchanged in spite of having a markedly untypical body.  This is in the matter of 
linguistic fluency.  The claim is that just as any damage to the body of a rabbit is 
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completely invisible in a baby rabbit that it sires, so any damage to the body of a 
human (even congenital damage) is (or at least can be), completely invisible in the 
language it speaks.  Though the language of humans, like the genetic code of rabbits, 
is structured by the bodily form of the species (a kind of body-centred Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis) the language of any individual remains the same as that of the species 
whatever its body is like so long as the minimal amount is left that is required to 
enable embedding in the bath of language generated by the rest of the species.  This 
minimal body might well include the brain, the larynx, and the ears or equivalents but 
it is up for debate.8 
This claim has been expressed in terms of `the strong interactional hypothesis:’   
A person with maximal interactional expertise and no contributory expertise 
will be indistinguishable from a person with both in any test based on verbal 
interchange alone 
Here, `contributory expertise’ is the means and abilities to take part fully in a human 
activity while interactional expertise indicates linguistic fluency gained through 
immersion in the linguistic community without any corresponding physical 
interaction. 
                                                 
 
 
8 For an indication of how the debate might go, or even whether the thesis stands up, 
see Selinger, Dreyfus and Collins, 2007.   
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The strong interactional hypothesis can be, and has been, experimentally and 
observationally tested.9  It has been shown that the colour-blind are indistinguishable 
from colour perceivers in Turing-test like situations because they spend their lives 
surrounded by the talk of colour perceivers; that a sociologist who has been long 
immersed in the field of gravitational wave physics can pass as a gravitational wave 
physicist when compared with and questioned by other gravitational wave physicists 
who knew that only one full-blown physicist was taking part in the test; and it is 
backed up in a looser way by Sacks’s observations of the linguistic abilities of the 
famously disabled `Madeleine.’10 
Socialness, language, and artificial intelligence 
So what does all this mean for the project of artificial intelligence?   It could be said 
that AI is three different things.  The goal of AI-1 is to engineer devices that are 
useful to humans because they can take over some of the things we normally have to 
do ourselves (such as grammar and spell-checking or controlling the washing 
machine).  Whether these devices do the job in just the same way as humans, or even 
produce an outcome that is exactly the same as that produced by humans, is of no 
                                                 
 
 
9 Collins and Evans, 2007. 
10 Sacks, 1985.  As with many provocative experiments, the interpretation of these has 
been challenged (Selinger, Dreyfus and Collins, 2007). 
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concern so long as the machines are useful.  I believe that The Shape of Actions, the 
book by Kusch and I, provides a framework for putting together recipes for the 
construction of useful machines under AI-1.  With the recipes in hand, progress would 
be more sure-footed and there would be far less chance of falling foul of the old 
mistakes caused by lack of understanding of the social in the wider AI community – 
that is, failure to understand polimorphic actions. 
The goal of AI-2 is to reproduce and thereby understand human behaviour and human 
thought.  Those with this goal in mind will certainly have to understand Dreyfus and 
Heidegger because their ideas are central to understanding the way individual humans 
interact with the physical environment.  There remains the problem of understanding 
language and socialisation but that problem is common to AI-2 and AI-3, the 
discussion of which now follows.   
The goal of AI-3 is to mimic human actions, or subsets of human actions, exactly, 
irrespective of the means.  As I see it, the goal of AI-3 is not so much to understand 
the nature of humans as to understand the nature of knowledge.  For AI-3, balancing 
on a bike is a certain type of knowledge the possession of which can be mimicked by 
a machine, while riding in traffic is a different kind of knowledge that cannot 
(foreseeably) be mimicked.  For the Dreyfusian approach, centred on the body, bike-
balancing and bike-riding are traffic are not dissimilar because the way humans do 
them is equally hard to explicate.  The fact that humans tend to learn both in roughly 
the same way – by guided instruction without self-conscious rule-following at the 
highest level of achievement -- is just a coincidence as far as the knowledge approach 
is concerned.  In principle, one can understand the nature of knowledge by building a 
machine that has knowledge even if it does not have it in the same way as humans, 
and has not learned it in the same way as humans.  Analogously, humans pull things: 
one may understand the nature of pulling (AI-3) by examining farm tractors even 
though humans don’t have diesel engines or wheels; one may not, however, 
understand how humans use force (AI-2) by examining tractors.  Here again, I believe 
The Shape of Actions draws the dividing line between what kind of mimicking 
machines can be built and what can’t be built in exactly the right place because it 
concentrates on knowledge rather than bodies.   
  
 
16
To exemplify again, one sub-goal of AI-3 is to build machines that can pass the 
Turing Test irrespective of whether the artificial brain/entity is like the human brain.  
It has been said that the Turing Test is too easy to be a true test of AI, even AI-3, but 
this is far from true.  No machine has come anywhere near passing unless the judges 
were unaware that a test was taking place.  If the judges do not know it is a test then it 
becomes a test of hoaxing ability rather than language use; hoaxing is not imitating 
because the `hoaxee’ contributes a great deal to the result whereas in an imitation 
game, almost the whole contribution must be made by the imitator.11  Furthermore, a 
powerful Turing Test is very easy to design.  It can be much more straightforward 
than the test as imagined by Turing.  The test need only compare the ability of 
machine and person to edit small passages of text designed by a competent judge:   
The problem of editing is easily explained.  Consider the following sentence:  `My 
spell-checker will correct weerd processor but won’t correct world processor.’  That is 
literally true as is revealed by the jagged red line beneath `weerd,’ and the absence of 
such a line beneath `world,’ in the text as it appears on my computer screen as I write 
this passage.  (Try it!)  Now, it might be possible to rectify the problem by making a 
more elaborate spell-checker that checks word-pairings as well as single words.  But 
the point is that the human who edits this piece is going to know that neither word is 
                                                 
 
 
11 Collins and Evans 2007 has more on the editing test and on hoaxing vs imitation 
games.  See also Chapter 2, on bogus doctors, in Collins and Pinch 2005. 
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in need of correction because it is written exactly as intended.  To make a spell-
checker that can do that would require that it understand the whole of this paragraph 
and that means being fluent in the language and understanding the argument – a 
matter of polimorphic actions -- not just using look-up tables, however complex.12   
Thus, a machine that could edit well-chosen passages as competently as a human 
editor would have to mimic the social embeddedness of a human editor.  But, as of 
now, the only way we know how to mimic social embeddedness is to embed in 
society – to do it the way humans do it.  As things stand, then, AI-2 and AI-3 are 
identical in respect of this problem.  To pass a well-designed Turing Test a machine 
would have to be embedded in society.  Such a machine could develop interactional 
expertise in any domain in which it was embedded.  It would no longer be merely 
mimicking what animals do but mimicking the thing that humans do that is beyond 
the reach of animals.  It would, in other words, be the kind of entity which has 
socialness and, as result, can participate in language communities.  It would have to 
come to own the specialist tacit knowledge that pertains to linguistic fluency in a 
specialist domain.  It could do this, as I believe it to have been shown, without much 
in the way of a body. 
                                                 
 
 
12 Very complicated look-up tables have been invented after the style of John Searle’s 
`Chinese Room.’  However ingenious, unless continually updated by humans, such 
those who construct the initial entries, they still fail any Turing Test that takes place in 
a changing world. 
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Conclusion 
I have argued that the problem of artificial intelligence cannot be solved unless it 
confronts the central role of socialness in human life.  This confrontation will not take 
place so long as the problem of mimicking animals and the problem of mimicking 
humans is conflated.  Unfortunately, such a conflation is encouraged within the new 
orthodoxy, which takes it that the body is central to the problem of AI.  I can see no 
reason of principle (there may be lots of technical reasons), why animals should not 
be mimicked by artificial intelligence techniques.  If this is correct, there is also no 
reason of principle why human abilities that consist of mimeomorphic actions alone 
should not be mimicked by artifical intelligence techniques.13   As for machines 
mimicking polimorphic actions, there may or may not be reasons of principle that 
prevent it being done.  What we can say for certain is that there is no currently 
foreseeable way to do it.  We do not even know how human babies grow up to be 
human adults never mind how to make machines embed themselves in human 
societies.  Furthermore, such machines would have to embed themselves in the way 
that humans embed themselves.  The `location’ of language and culture, in so far as it 
is the `grey matter,’ is the grey matter in the many human brains that make up 
language-speaking or cultural communities.  As Clark argues, the human mind is 
                                                 
 
 
13 The domain of mimeomorphic actions is explored in The Shape of Actions (Collins 
and Kusch 1998). 
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extended -- but it is extended through other minds, not just artefacts.14  Individuals do 
not decide which words or which mannerisms will come into use in society and which 
will fade away, the collectivity decides.  Individuals propose but only the collectivity 
disposes.  An artificial brain would have to be able to propose and judge its proposals 
according to its judgements of potential success and then accept success or failure just 
as the human individual does.  It is a business that is very hard to understand. 
Dreyfus is right to pour scorn on Rodney Brooks’s attempts to model human 
behaviour by building the robot COG and its successors.  Elsewhere I have referred to 
this as cargo cult science.15  Just as the Pacific Islanders hoped that building 
something in the form of a runway would bring cargo, Brooks seems to have hoped 
that building something with some minor resemblance to a human would bring 
intelligence.  Dreyfus’s reasons and mine for criticising Brooks are different, 
however.  Dreyfus thinks Brooks’s project was hopeless because he did not build 
anything that resembled a human in terms of bodily abilities.  I think the project was 
hopeless because he did not even begin to think about how COG could be socialised.  
The idea that some simple reward and punishment regime is equivalent to 
socialisation is plainly ridiculous because, so far as I understand, even devices with 
                                                 
 
 
14 Collins, Clark and Shrager, 2008.   
15 Collins, Clark and Shrager, 2008. 
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brains and bodies identical to those of humans (human babies) brought up in this 
equivalent of a Skinner box fail to learn to be social adults.  What is needed is to 
understand socialisation better or work out how to mimic it by some other means.  
Perhaps this will be more likely to come about if we incline ourselves to study human 
knowledge rather than the way humans possess knowledge.  
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